Uncertainty pervades the electoral arena. Many voters are unsure about the issue positions of candidates, either because candidates are deliberately ambiguous or because voters fail to receive campaign messages. In theory, uncertainty a¤ects how voters make choices, which strategies candidates adopt, and who wins or loses elections. In practice, though, problems of measurement and endogeneity have impeded empirical research about the electoral e¤ects of ambiguity. We design and administer survey experiments that overcome these obstacles by manipulating the ambiguity in candidate platforms. We …nd that, on average, ambiguity does not repel and may in fact attract voters. The preference for vague versus precise candidates depends partly on individual attitudes toward risk, and on the tendency to see ambiguous candidates from one's own party in a favorable light.
Introduction
Uncertainty about the issue positions of candidates is pervasive in democratic politics. Many candidates take ambiguous stands intentionally, and even those who de…ne their positions precisely can be perceived as unclear by voters who fail to receive or correctly interpret campaign messages.
A theoretical literature has developed about uncertainty in elections. This work considers why candidates would …nd it optimal to equivocate and invokes uncertainty to explain central puzzles about electoral competition. Imperfect information about the positions of candidates might, for example, explain why politicians take divergent positions, contrary to the median voter theorem, and why incumbents have systematic advantages and disadvantages over challengers (Berger, Munger, and Pottho¤ 2000; Shepsle 1972 ).
Empirical research has not proceeded apace, due mainly to problems of measurement and endogeneity. The most widely recognized obstacle to inference has been inadequate data about candidate positions. Some analysts have resorted to indirect estimation (Campbell 1983; Bartels 1986; Gill 2005; Berinsky and Lewis 2007) ; others have incorporated direct measures into specialized surveys (Brady and Ansolabehere 1989; Alvarez and Franklin 1994) . Unfortunately, these studies reach contradictory conclusions about the consequences of ambiguity. Moreover, their methodological innovations, though valuable, do not eliminate measurement problems, nor do they address the fact that knowledge about candidates is endogeneous to citizen preferences and candidate strategies.
We design and administer survey experiments that overcome these obstacles by manipulating the ambiguity in candidate platforms. In our experiments, voters choose between candidates who state policy positions with varying levels of precision. Data from our experiments reveal that, on average, ambiguity does not repel and may in fact attract voters. The preference for vague versus precise candidates depends partly on individual attitudes toward risk, and on the tendency to see ambiguous candidates from one's own party in a favorable light.
In the remainder of the paper, we explain why voters may be attracted to or repelled by candidates with equivocal policy positions. We then discuss the …ndings and limitations of existing research about the consequences of candidate ambiguity. Finally, we develop and analyze experiments that isolate the e¤ects of ambiguity on voter perceptions and behavior.
Theoretical Approaches
Candidates often take ambiguous positions that leave voters uncertain. Although voters may have educated expectations about a vague candidate, they do not know precisely what policies the candidate represents. In a path-breaking article, Shepsle (1972) incorporated this fact into formal models of candidate competition.
Consider a unidimensional policy space in which one candidate takes a single stand, and the other candidate represents a probability distribution over points in the issue space.
Denote these two candidates as certain (C) and ambiguous (A). If voters have single-peaked utility functions, under what conditions would they prefer A over C? In this section, we describe three theoretical approaches to this question. Shepsle (1972) and nearly all subsequent contributors have used expected utility theory to analyze the choice between precise and ambiguous candidates. In this framework, each voter evaluates candidates based on the satisfaction they are likely to bring. The expected utility from candidate C is simply EU (C) = u(c), where c represents the candidate's position and u(:) is the voter's utility function. The anticipated payo¤ from A is slightly more complicated, because the voter cannot know in advance which outcome A will produce. The expected outcome from electing A is a probability-weighted average, E(A) = R a p(a)ada, where p(a) gives the probability of point a. Similarly, the expected utility from selecting the ambiguous candidate is EU (A) = R a p(a)u(a)da.
Expected Utility
Whether the expected utility criterion favors the ambiguous candidate depends partly on the voter's attitude toward risk, as re ‡ected in the shape of his or her utility function.
Researchers commonly assume that voters are risk averse (Enelow and Hinich 1981; Bartels 1986; Alvarez 1998; Gill 2005) . Such voters receive less utility from playing the lottery than from receiving its expected payo¤ with certainty, i.e. EU (A) < u( ). They will, therefore, prefer the certain candidate when c = . Moreover, voters whose bliss points are closer to than to c might nonetheless opt for the certain candidate to avoid the risk that A could deliver undesirable outcomes.
The idea of risk aversion is typically formalized by assuming that u is a quadratic loss function, (x v) 2 , where x is the perceived location of the candidate and v is the voter's ideal point. This form has convenient mathematical properties. It dictates that a voter would Of course, voters may be indi¤erent between gambles and their expected outcomes, i.e.
EU (A) = u( ). These risk-neutral voters would prefer the ambiguous candidate if and only if j vj < jc vj.
Biased Probabilities
To this point, we have assumed that people use objective probabilities: they soberly evaluate where candidates are likely to stand, given the available information. We now relax this assumption and explore the possibility that voters have biased perceptions about the policies ambiguous candidates would be most likely to adopt.
The …rst possibility is general optimism: when confronted with an ambiguous candidate, optimistic voters assume the candidate is closer to themselves than the facts would warrant.
Operationally, they perceive a probability distribution more favorable to themselves than the evidence allows, resulting in an optimistic expectation o , such that j o vj < j vj.
Other factors equal, such misperception would increase the likelihood that the voter would choose the ambiguous candidate over the precise one.
Previous research suggests the plausibility of this hypothesis. Psychological studies since the 1950s have documented that people systematically overestimate the probability of desirable events (e.g. Irwin 1953; Rosenhan and Messick 1966) . Studies have also uncovered powerful evidence of a "false consensus e¤ect,"in which people overestimate the probability of agreement with people whose views are not already known. Importantly, people tend to make this mistake "regardless of their sentiment toward the group" (Krosnick 2002, 125) .
Across-the-board optimism should give ambiguous candidates a boost in competition with precise alternatives. As Page (1976, 748) speculated in one of the earliest contributions to the literature on ambiguity in political campaigns, even risk-averse voters "might overestimate probabilities of favorable outcomes"and therefore "favor a lottery candidate over one taking a clear stand at its expected value."
An alternative hypothesis holds that voters are selectively optimistic and pessimistic; they expand or contract the perceived distance between themselves and candidates, depending on the degree of a¤ective a¢ nity for the ambiguous candidate they are evaluating. This idea is the focus of the extensive but currently inconclusive literature about how citizens project views onto candidates (for a review, see Krosnick 2002 
Maximin and Maximax
A third set of theories considers how people behave when they have little information about the probability distributions associated with vague candidates. Perhaps citizens can pin ambiguous candidates to a range-they know the set of policy positions the vague candidate might adopt-but have no clear beliefs about the relative likelihood of each outcome in the set.
In this low-information situation, how might voters choose between precise and ambiguous candidates? One possibility, suggested by Weisberg and Fiorina (1980, 245) , is maximin voting, in which "the citizen goes through a worst-case analysis and defends himself against the worst." More formally, the voter identi…es the minimum possible payo¤ that each candidate could yield, and then selects the candidate that maximizes the minimum. By this criterion, voters would prefer the ambiguous candidate over the precise alternative whenever
Alternatively, voters in information-poor environments might apply the maximax rule, elections, voters are four times more likely to predict victory for their own candidate than for the opposition (Granberg and Brent 1983 ; see also Uhlaner and Grofman 1986 [ Table 1 about here]
The theories in Table 1 Beyond the American context, Morgenstern and Zechmeister (2001) found that many Mexican voters were risk acceptant, and that their penchant for gambling propelled the major political transformations in that country over the past decade. Risk-averse citizens tended to prefer the "devil they knew,"the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) that had ruled Mexico since the 1930s. Risk-acceptant citizens, in contrast, took a chance with the opposition, whose issue positions were less clear and whose ascendancy would have caused unpredictable changes in the Mexican economy. Morgenstern and Zechmeister therefore rejected the assumption, common in formal models of voting, that citizens prefer clear candidates to ambiguous ones with the same expected outcome.
Why have there been so few empirical studies, and why has previous research reached such con ‡icting conclusions about a topic so central to democratic politics? We argue that previous research has been stymied by inadequate data about candidate platforms and by seemingly insurmountable problems of endogeneity.
The Challenge of Measurement
To investigate the e¤ects of candidate ambiguity, one would need reliable data about the issue positions of candidates. The American National Election Study (NES) took a valuable step in this direction during the 1960s, when it began asking respondents to locate candidates on seven-point issue scales. To our knowledge, studies of candidate ambiguity have generally employed NES data or involved questionnaires that mimic the NES issue-scale format.
Asking citizens to place candidates on a number line raises thorny problems, however.
First, it is not obvious how one should interpret the point estimates that citizens supply, especially when candidates have been vague about policy. Some citizens, for example, could be reporting the mean of the probability distribution, E(A) = . Others could be describing the mode, which would di¤er from the mean if the underlying distribution were asymmetrical or multi-peaked. Still others could be engaging in random sampling by drawing arbitrarily from the probability distribution and reporting the selected value to the interviewer. Bestcase and worst-case reporting are also conceivable. Any of these approaches would be reasonable responses to standard NES questions about the candidate's position.
To illustrate the potential for confusion, Weisberg and Fiorina (1980, 241) o¤er the historically important case of Nixon's policy toward Vietnam. "Consider," they write, "a citizen who believes that Richard Nixon will either pull out of Vietnam or escalate the war."
They sketch a probability distribution over a seven point scale from 1 (immediate withdrawal)
to 7 Bartels (1986) proposed one approach, based on the pattern of "don't know"responses.
Suppose that each person has a latent degree of uncertainty about where the candidate stands; that people whose uncertainty exceeds a particular threshold will refuse to place the candidate on the scale; and that uncertainty, though unobservable, varies with demographic and contextual variables that are present in the NES. One could then estimate a probit model of nonresponse, compute the predicted probability of nonresponse for each citizen with respect to each candidate and issue, and use the predicted probabilities as measures of uncertainty. Unfortunately, the two leading applications of this approach have reached opposite conclusions about the e¤ects of candidate ambiguity (Bartels 1986; Berinsky and Lewis 2007) . Moreover, even proponents of the probit method acknowledge that it "requires strong assumptions" (Berinsky and Lewis 2007, 144) and is "su¢ ciently indirect that any attempt to derive general conclusions about the political signi…cance of issue uncertainty would be foolhardy" (Bartels 1986, 726) .
Other scholars have used the sample distribution of issue placements as a basis for measuring ambiguity. Campbell (1983) , for example, computed the standard deviation of public perceptions about each candidate's position, and Gill (2005) calculated entropy scores, which are less sensitive than standard deviations to the shape of the empirical distribution.
As Bartels (1986, 710) pointed out, however, there is "no necessary connection" between individual-level uncertainty and population-wide variability. If, for example, all voters were uncertain about a candidate's position but had-and reported-the same expectation, standard deviations and entropy scores would overstate voters'certainty. Conversely, if voters disagreed about where a candidate stood but were completely …rm in their beliefs, standard deviations and entropy scores would overstate the ambiguity in voters'minds.
A few scholars have measured ambiguity directly by asking people how certain they feel about the positions of candidates. Alvarez and Franklin (1994) pioneered this approach. In a unique study, they not only asked respondents to locate candidates on a scale, but also invited them to say whether they were "very certain, pretty certain, or not very certain" about where the candidate stood. Brady and Ansolabehere (1989) promise, but they are rarely available in standard surveys, and they leave open the question of whether point estimates re ‡ect the mean, the mode, the worst case, the best case, or a random draw from the ambiguous candidate's probability distribution. Much progress has been made since the 1960s, but researchers still lack adequate measures about the issue platforms of ambiguous candidates.
The Problem of Endogeneity
Even without measurement problems, three sources of endogeneity make inference di¢ cult.
First, preferences a¤ect the incentive to collect information. Citizens are probably more attentive to candidates they like: they attend rallies and may follow media reports more often for their favorite candidate than for the opposition. or positivity bias. When they encounter a candidate that seems attractive on other grounds, they perceive more of the candidate's probability distribution as being piled near their own ideal point. In the extreme, voters may perceive their vague but favored candidate to be a probability spike over the most attractive point in the candidate's range. When asked how certain they feel, voters could then report more precision than the facts would warrant.
In the minds of voters-and therefore the datasets of researchers-the vague candidate will appear overly precise, causing a downward bias in the estimated bene…ts of ambiguity.
Third, endogeneity may arise because candidates are strategic: they take into account the likely reaction of voters when deciding how much information to reveal. In situations when voters would react harshly against ambiguity, candidates will tend to avoid equivocation, leaving little opportunity to observe the public backlash. By the same logic, rational candidates will avoid precision when it would be most damaging to their electoral fortunes.
Thus, the strategic behavior of candidates will confound e¤orts by researchers to detect the consequences of ambiguity.
Taken together, problems of measurement and endogeneity pose seemingly insurmountable obstacles to studying the e¤ects of candidate ambiguity. In the next section, we describe an experiment that overcomes these obstacles.
We designed an experiment to assess the e¤ect of candidate ambiguity on voter choice, and embedded it in an internet survey of a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults. Our experiment involved four steps. First, we measured respondents' preferences about the appropriate level of government services. Second, using the same issue, we described the platforms of vague and precise candidates and asked who respondents preferred. Third, we asked respondents to supply a point estimate for the location of a vague candidate. Finally, we collected data on the party a¢ liation and risk preferences of participants. Each step is described below.
Measuring Respondents'Ideal Points
The survey began by asking respondents about a key political issue, government provision of services. Following the NES, we explained: "Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending.
Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services, even if it means an increase in spending." We then asked respondents to select one of seven alternatives: increase services by a large, medium, or small amount; keep the same amount of services; or decrease services by small, medium, or large amount. The positions were described verbally rather than numerically, though for convenience we sometimes use the integers 1-7 as shorthand for the seven fully labeled options.
As a follow-up, we asked half the participants how certain they felt about their own position. The options included extremely sure, very sure, moderately sure, slightly sure,
and not sure at all. We assigned this question to only half the sample to guard against the possibility of priming. Respondents who expressed certainty about their own position, for example, might have felt pressure to choose precise candidates over vague ones with similar expected locations, in order to remain consistent with their stated level of certainty. As it turned out, our concerns about priming were unwarranted: respondents behaved similarly regardless of whether they had been asked about the …rmness of their own position.
Measuring Preferences About Candidates
We then measured preferences about two candidates, one vague and the other precise. "In the last election,"participants were told, "candidates were surveyed by a non-partisan group.
We would like your views about two candidates, whose names will remain con…dential."
Using the same issue and policy options that respondents had seen previously, we o¤ered verbal and graphical summaries of the platforms of two candidates (Figure 1a-c) . The precise candidate took one of seven discrete positions on the scale. The ambiguous candidate, in contrast, simply advocated that "the government should increase services" or that "the government should decrease services," but in neither case said how much. Our description of the vague candidate was purposefully neutral. We avoided language that might have been taken as criticism or praise of ambiguity. After displaying the views of both candidates, we asked which one the respondent preferred.
[ Figure 1 about here]
In the experiment, we randomly assigned unbranded candidates (identi…ed by the letters "A"and "B") to half the respondents and party branded candidates (identi…ed by the labels Democrat and Republican) to the other half. Each type o¤ered unique opportunities for inference. By denoting some candidates with letters, we were able to test many theories of ambiguity in their purest form, without the potentially confounding e¤ects of party. By denoting other candidates as Democrat and Republican, the design allowed us to study how partisanship-one of the most powerful factors in electoral politics-conditions the consequences of ambiguity. Respondents retained their initial assignments (unbranded or branded) for the duration of the interview.
We also randomized the locations of candidates. Our strati…ed random assignment algorithm ensured, to the greatest extent possible, that each respondent had an equal chance of receiving one of four types of scenarios. In Type I, the certain candidate is closer to the voter, i.e. jv cj < jv j, where v is the voter's bliss point, c is the position of the certain candidate, and is the center of the vague candidate's interval. Type II reverses the inequality, such that the ambiguous candidate is the proximity favorite. Type III, a straddle tie, occurs when the certain candidate takes a position at the center of the vague candidate's interval, i.e. c = . Finally Type IV, a re ‡ected tie, arises when the respondent stands between the two candidates and is equidistant to them, i.e. jv cj = jv j > 0.
the precise candidate was randomly assigned to one of the seven discrete positions. The ambiguous candidate, in contrast, took one of the three central ranges: increase medium to keep the same, increase small to decrease small, and keep the same to decrease medium. Because these positions were more cumbersome to describe verbally, we leveraged respondents' familiarity with our format by o¤ering a graphical summary without a verbal description, as in Figure 1d . 4 We ended this phase of the experiment by displaying two more pairs of candidates, which we positioned to allow within-subject analysis of the e¤ects of ambiguity. Our method involved repeating the earlier scenarios but switching one of the candidates from ambiguous to precise or vice-versa. We refer to these follow-up con…gurations as "shadow" scenarios.
To make our method more concrete, suppose that respondents initially considered a race between a certain candidate who wanted to increase services by a small amount (c = 3) and a vague candidate who wanted to increase services but did not say how much ( = 2). This scenario has two possible shadows: a con…guration with two precise candidates, one at 3 and the other at 2; and a con…guration with two vague candidates, one centered on 3 and the other centered on 2. when voters were at positions 2, 3, 4, or 5, 6, but remained at [1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0] when voters were at positions 1 or 7. Our …ndings about voter behavior senario Type IV should be interpreted with this fact in mind. 5 When subjects had considered a straddle tie between two unbranded candidates, we choose not to construct a shadow scenario, because the candidates in the shadow scenario would have been identical in all respects except the letter identifying them.
Measuring Expectations about Vague Candidates
The third phase of our experiment investigated how citizens form expectations about the likely positions of vague candidates. We requested that respondents think about a candidate who was randomly assigned to one of …ve vague intervals and depicted with the now-familiar square bracket. The candidate was identi…ed as Democrat or Republican in the party branded condition, and by a single letter in the unbranded condition (Figure 2) . We concluded by asking: "If you had to guess, which position do you think this candidate would actually take?"and o¤ering a choice of the three precise positions spanned by the bracket.
[ Figure 2 about here]
As should be clear, our experiment focused on a single policy issue: the level of government services. One could have designed a di¤erent experiment in which respondents located themselves, selected candidates, and reported expectations in a multi-dimensional issue space. Such a design would have increased complexity and complicated the process of inference. Without strong assumptions about the weight each respondent placed on each issue in the survey, for example, it would have been di¢ cult to isolate the e¤ects of ambiguity. By focusing on one issue at a time, our method makes it possible to identify the e¤ects of ambiguity with the minimum number of assumptions.
Measuring Party Identi…cation and Taste for Risk
In the …nal phase of the interview, we measured respondents' party a¢ liations. People were asked either to indicate that they had no party preference or to classify themselves as Republican, Democrat, Independent, or other. Those who did not choose one of the two major parties in the …rst branch were asked, in a follow-up, whether they thought of themselves as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic party. With this question format, we were able to classify nearly all respondents-with the exception of the 3 percent who skipped the question-as falling on either the Democratic or the Republican side of the political spectrum.
We closed the interview by assessing voters' attitudes toward risk. "Some people like taking risks,"we noted. "Other people prefer to avoid taking risks whenever possible. What about you? Do you prefer to take risks, prefer to avoid taking risks, or don't you have a preference either way?" We placed this item last to avoid priming respondents to think about risk when selecting between vague and precise candidates. 
Data and Findings
The experiments discussed in this article were administered by Knowledge Networks, an internet-based polling …rm, with support from the National Science Foundation. By using random digit dialing to recruit participants and by providing internet access to households that do not already have it, Knowledge Networks is able to administer questionnaires to a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults. The interviews took place in August 2007, and 1,000 people (80 percent of invitees) agreed to take the survey. In this section we describe our …ndings. jv cj jv j. In our data, the distance di¤erential ranges from -5 to 5, but we combine -4 with -5 and 4 with 5 to increase the sample size at the extremes.
The Average E¤ect of Ambiguity
[ Table 2 about here]
The table reveals two clear patterns. First, proximity strongly in ‡uences the decisions of voters (see also Tomz and Van Houweling 2007) . According to proximity theory, ambiguous candidates are at an electoral disadvantage when the distance di¤erential is negative, but they enjoy an electoral advantage when the di¤erential is positive. Our data are highly consistent with this expectation. In the unbranded condition, support for the ambiguous candidate increased from a low of 4 percent when the di¤erence di¤erential was -4 or less, to a high of 94 percent when the ambiguous candidate enjoyed a proximity advantage of at least 4 points. Data from the party branded condition display an even stronger pattern.
As the di¤erence di¤erential shifted from its minimum to its maximum value, the ambiguous candidate went from having no supporters to enjoying almost unanimous backing.
Second and just as striking, ambiguity appears to carry no signi…cant cost. Averaged across all scenarios in the table, with or without party brand names, respondents were as likely to choose the ambiguous candidate as they were to choose the precise one. Ambiguity seems innocuous even when one restricts attention to ties, in which the voter was equidistant to the certain candidate and the midpoint of the vague interval. With ties, approximately 48 percent of voters in the unbranded condition and 56 percent of voters in the party branded condition liked the ambiguous candidate more than the precise one. These …ndings run counter to the standard assumption that voters are risk averse.
To check the robustness of these surprising …ndings, we next turned to within-subject analysis. In particular, we compared how each voter behaved in response to two precise candidates with how he or she behaved when confronted with an otherwise identical scenario in which one candidate "became vague"without shifting left or right.
To clarify this empirical strategy, consider a con…guration with two precise candidates, W and X, at points w and x. Then consider a di¤erent con…guration in which candidate Y announces an ambiguous platform centered on w, while candidate Z locates exactly at
x. If a voter selected X and Y in these two scenarios, she was attracted by Y's ambiguity.
If, on the other hand, the voter favored W and Z, she was repelled by ambiguity. Voters who chose W, Z were not repelled; they continued to favor the candidate at w, even when that candidate became ambiguous. Finally, voters who chose X, Z were not attracted by ambiguity; they remained supportive of the candidate at x, even when the opponent shifted from precise to vague. Table 3 reports the …ndings from this within-subject analysis. In the unbranded condition, nearly 19 percent of respondents who could have been attracted by ambiguity were drawn to it. In contrast, less than 13 percent of respondents who might have been repelled were turned away. We arrived at these estimates via conditional probability analysis. Using notation from our example, 39 of the 207 voters who supported X also opted for Y, and 35 of the 275 voters who supported W also chose Z. Comparable values in the party-branded condition were about 8 and 3 percent, respectively. These values are conservative because they include cases in which the distance di¤erential was so large that ambiguity would have made no di¤erence.
[ Table 3 about here]
On balance, then, ambiguity had a slightly positive e¤ect on the fortunes of political candidates. The net bene…t of ambiguity was 6.1 percentage points for unbranded candidates and 4.3 percentage points for party branded candidates.
Although not enormous, the di¤erences were (just) statistically distinguishable from zero at the 95 percent con…dence level and could have been decisive in a close election. Thus, our between-subject and within-subject analyses reinforce each other by demonstrating that ambiguity is not costly and may, in fact, be slightly advantageous.
Why do so many voters in our study seem to support ambiguity? Why do voters respond somewhat di¤erently in the branded and unbranded conditions? And how do the individual characteristics of voters a¤ect whether they are attracted to or repelled by ambiguity? The next three sections explore these questions in greater detail, using three distinct analytical techniques.
Using Ties to Test Causal Mechanisms
As a …rst step toward isolating causal mechanisms, we exploited the special characteristics of ties (situations in which the distance di¤erential is zero). Triple conjunctions (scenarios in which c = = v) are especially interesting, because no canonical theory-risk acceptance, general optimism, positivity bias, or maximax decision making-would predict support for the ambiguous candidate in these scenarios. After all, when the certain candidate and the voter coincide, the voter can gain nothing and may lose signi…cantly by selecting the risky candidate. Existing theories therefore imply that the precise candidate dominates the ambiguous when all three parameters are aligned.
In these special situations, however, respondents chose the ambiguous option 25 percent of the time when candidates were unbranded, and 40 percent of the time when candidates were party branded. What explains this pattern? One possibility, which we suggested as a supplement to existing theories, is that voters value ‡exibility. They are attracted to ambiguous candidates because they regard them as more willing to adapt policy to changing circumstances.
A second possibility, which applies only to the party branded condition, is blind party bias. Perhaps citizens break ties not by determining which candidate presents less risk, but by blindly selecting the candidate from their own party. If such bias were ubiquitous, respondents in our experiment, which randomized party labels, would have chosen the vague candidate around 50 percent of the time. By comparing reactions to triple conjunctions in the unbranded and branded conditions, however, one sees that pure party bias could have 
Using Logistic Regression to Test Causal Mechanisms
We next used logistic regression to test mechanisms that have been hypothesized in the literature. The dependent variable in our model took a value of 1 if the respondent chose the ambiguous candidate and a value of 0 otherwise. The model contained four key explanatory variables. First, we included the distance di¤erential, which is central to proximity theory and proved highly consequential in Table 2 . In our sample, the distance di¤erential ranged from -5 to 5 with a modal value of 0. Controlling for other factors, the distance di¤erential should exert a positive e¤ect on the probability of selecting the ambiguous candidate.
The second explanatory variable in our model was risk aversion. Standard expected utility theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, risk averse individuals will be less likely to gamble on imprecise candidates. Our measure of risk aversion was coded as 1 if respondents reported that they preferred to avoid taking risks and coded as 0 otherwise.
The third independent variable measured voters'certainty about their own location. We expected that respondents who were very certain about their own positions would be less likely to favor imprecise candidates. On the other hand, respondents that felt unsure of their own stands would be less repelled by imprecise candidates, and perhaps even attracted by their ‡exibility. Our measure took a value of 1 when respondents expressed extreme certainty about their location on the government services and spending scale and 0 for all others.
Finally, to test hypotheses about positivity and negativity bias, we included party match as an explanatory variable. Party match, de…ned only in the party branded sample, was 1 if the voter and the ambiguous candidate belonged to the same party and 0 otherwise.
Positivity and negativity theory imply that, other factors equal, respondents would feel more optimistic about the locations of vague candidates from their own party and more pessimistic about the positions of vague candidates from the other party. Thus, on average, party matches should increase the probability of choosing the vague candidate.
The parameter estimates and standard errors from the logistic regression appear in Table   4 . The substantive implications are presented in Table 5 , to which we now turn. As expected, risk averse citizens in the unbranded condition were less likely to select the ambiguous candidate. The bottom row of Table 5a summarizes the e¤ect. Risk aversion reduced support for the vague candidate by 9 percentage points when respondents were certain of their own position and by 10 percentage points when respondents were uncertain. These e¤ects were (just) signi…cant at the 95 percent con…dence level in a two-sided hypothesis test. Thus, the logit regression con…rms that a meaningful proportion of people avoided ambiguous candidates because they did not like taking risks.
[ Table 4 about here]
[ Table 5 about here]
The certainty with which respondents held their own positions exerted a similar e¤ect, reported in the right column of Table 5a . Respondents who felt very certain of their position were about 8 percentage points less likely than other respondents to select the imprecise candidate. The estimated e¤ect was substantial, though it fell just short of statistical signi…cance at the 95 percent con…dence level.
The compound e¤ects of these two variables, shown in the lower right order of Table 5a, were considerable. Support for the ambiguous candidate was 18 percentage points lower among respondents who were both risk averse and sure of their bliss point than among respondents who were more acceptant of risk and less certain of their policy preferences.
Thus, the risk propensities and con…dence levels of respondents strongly in ‡uenced how voters responded to unbranded candidates.
The introduction of party brand names muted these e¤ects. What accounts for voter preferences in the party branded condition, if not risk aversion and respondent certainty? Figure 3 illustrates the powerful e¤ect of common partisanship.
The horizontal axis measures the distance di¤erential from -5 to 5, and the vertical axis marks the estimated probability of choosing the vague candidate. The solid lines represent estimated probabilities, conditional on the distance di¤erential and party match but holding risk aversion and voter certainty at 0.
[ Figure 3 about here]
The …gure not only con…rms the e¤ect of distance, but also demonstrates that voters respond di¤erently to ambiguity from their own party than from the opposition. Regardless of the distance di¤erential, citizens were more likely to choose the vague candidate when their parties matched than when they did not. For example, when neither candidate had a proximity advantage (distance di¤erential = 0), around 82 percent of citizens chose a vague candidate who belonged to their party, but only 23 percent opted for a vague candidate from the opposite party.
Two hypotheses could account for the profound e¤ect of party match. The …rst is positivity/negativity bias, which would lead voters to view vague candidates of their own party as closer to themselves while seeing vague candidates of the opposite party as relatively more distant. The second possibility is blind partisanship, in which respondents vote for their own party without letting partisanship color their beliefs about the vague candidate's probability distribution. As a step toward disentangling these hypotheses, the next section tests for evidence of positivity and negativity bias.
Using Imputed Locations to Test Causal Mechanisms
Our experiment not only asked voters to choose between vague and precise candidates, but also to indicate where they expected ambiguous candidates to stand. We de…ne imputation bias as B = jv i j jv j, where v is the voter's bliss point, i is the location the voter imputed to the ambiguous candidate, and is the midpoint of the vague interval, which we regard as an unbiased reading of the candidate's position. Negative values of B would, therefore, imply optimism or positivity bias, in which respondents shifted the vague candidate's probability distribution toward their own ideal point. Positive values of B, on the other hand, would involve pessimism or negativity bias, in which respondents skewed the candidate's probability distribution away from themselves. Finally, B = 0 would mean no bias in either direction. Table 6 presents the average value of B, conditional on the party a¢ liations of the voter and the candidate.
[ Table 6 about here]
The Democrats showed a bias of .28 points (-0.31+0.03=-0.28).
Third, we found relatively little evidence of negativity bias. Voters from both parties exhibited small and statistically insigni…cant amounts of negativity when assessing imprecise candidates from the other party. They moved such candidates only 0.07 or 0.08 points further from their self-locations than an objective analysis of candidate positions would dictate. Overall, our data reveal strong positivity bias, which helps explain why proximityminded voters prefer ambiguous candidates from their own party more often than identical candidates from the opposition.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have o¤ered an experimental solution to measurement and endogeneity problems that have impeded previous research. Our between-subject and within-subject tests show that citizens are at least as likely to prefer ambiguous candidates as to prefer precise ones. Voters perceive and respond to ambiguity in di¤erent ways, though, depending on their personal characteristics and the electoral circumstances.
Formal models of choice under uncertainty typically focus on the risk preferences of choosers. We …nd that, on average, citizens in our study behaved as if they were risk neutral or even risk acceptant. Of course, such averages mask interesting individual-level variation. Some respondents said they preferred not to take risks and, at least when evaluating unbranded candidates, made choices that re ‡ected this predisposition. Their preferences were counterbalanced, however, by the many citizens who willingly gambled on ambiguous candidates, even when precise alternatives were at least as close.
Psychological theories focus on a di¤erent factor: potential biases in voters'perceptions about where ambiguous candidates stand. We found no evidence of general optimism about the locations of nonpartisan candidates. If anything, Republican voters worried that, on the issue of government services, vague candidates inclined away from rather than towards their own policy preferences. Their pessimism cannot explain why so many voters in the nonpartisan condition selected vague rather than precise candidates.
Our data strongly con…rm the existence of selective optimism, however. When voters encountered ambiguous candidates from their own party, they expected that such candidates would lean signi…cantly in their own direction, rather than implementing a policy at the center of their ambiguous platform. Beliefs about candidates from the opposite party were more neutral. We could not reject the hypothesis that voters had unbiased expectations about where the candidates stood. This asymmetry-strong positivity bias without corresponding negativity bias-helps make ambiguity a pro…table strategy, by enabling vague candidates to gain more support from their own partisans than they lose from other voters. Even risk averse voters might prefer vague candidates over speci…c alternatives because they view the world through selectively rose-colored glasses.
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Attitudes toward risk and selective optimism provide signi…cant explanatory leverage, but other unmodeled forces must be at work, as well. Fully 25 percent of respondents in the unbranded condition, and 40 percent in the party branded condition, selected the ambiguous candidate even in situations when the leading formal and psychological theories predicted unanimous support for the precise alternative. Moreover, our analyses suggest that random error could explain, at most, only half of these puzzling cases. Perhaps the others value ‡exibility in an uncertain world, and regard ambiguous candidates as more likely to possess this character trait. Although we cannot assess this hypothesis directly, we do …nd that people who themselves feel uncertain about the best course of action are, in the unbranded condition, more likely to prefer uncertain candidates.
In our study, ambiguity evoked di¤erent responses for partisan candidates than for nonpartisan ones. Future research should, therefore, take into account the mediating e¤ects of parties. Ambiguity might have di¤erent consequences in general elections than in primaries and non-partisan contests, for example. Our experimental approach could be adapted to study choices in these di¤erent contexts.
Other extensions are promising, as well. We portrayed ambiguity with neutral language, which neither encouraged nor discouraged voting for the ambiguous candidate. Future experiments could draw attention to the positive and negative sides of ambiguity. Experiments could also invite citizens to choose ranges rather than speci…c points on an issue scale (see Aldrich et al. 1982) . Finally, one could introduce other non-issue considerations that could be sources of positivity or negativity bias. Our evidence answers some foundational questions, while suggesting that e¤orts to study voter uncertainty should be redoubled. Note: The dependent took a value of 1 if the respondent chose the ambiguous candidate and took a value of 0 otherwise. Sample sizes were 650 in the unbranded condition and 615 in the branded condition. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Note: Based on the logistic regression in Table 4 . In each panel, the interior cells give the estimated percentage of respondents who chose the ambiguous candidate; the outer margin summarizes the separate and combined e¤ects of risk aversion and certainty about one's own position. 95 percent con…dence intervals appear in parentheses. The estimates were generated by holding the distance di¤erential at 0 and, in panel b, …xing party match equal to 0.5. Note: Based on the logistic regression in Table 4 , with risk aversion and respondent certainty held constant at 0. The solid lines are point estimates and the shaded areas are 95 percent con…dence intervals.
